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Abstract 
Since the presidential elections in 2014, Turkish voters abroad have cast 
their votes in three parliamentary elections, one presidential election, and 
one referendum. The relatively higher vote share that the Justice and Devel-
opment Party (AKP) and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan garnered in Ger-
many and other European states with large Turkish immigration levels, such 
as the Netherlands, Belgium, and Austria, has remained a cause for concern 
to politicians and the public in these countries. Especially in Germany, the 
dominant premise in the public debate has been that voting in favor of the 
AKP and Erdoğan is a sign of “loyalty to Turkey” and an absence of a com-
mitment to democratic values and norms. 
The broad appeal that the AKP and Erdoğan have among migrants from 
Turkey and their children has both a material and an emotional basis. Socio-
economic changes and perceived improvements in the quality of state insti-
tutions, both within Turkey and Germany, seem to have created a positive 
image of the party. In addition, a strong sense of pride arising out of the 
perception of a “strong Turkey” under the leadership of President Erdoğan 
seems to drive electoral support. Finally, a fear of losing social and political 
gains also facilitates electoral support for the AKP. 
Given that the interest of the Turkish government in the migrant popula-
tion is driven by its foreign- and domestic-policy ambitions, it is likely to 
continue in the future with a strong identitarian focus. Moreover, Turkey’s 
deepening economic crisis is also likely to accentuate the need for economic 
remittances. It is vitally important to differentiate between the Turkish gov-
ernment’s systematic efforts to instrumentalize migrants and their foreign-
born children toward its domestic- and foreign-policy ends and the demands 
of migrants for political representation and equal recognition. 
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Issues and Recommendations 
Rethinking Political Attitudes of Migrants 
from Turkey and Their Germany-Born 
Children: Beyond Loyalty and Democratic 
Culture 
As a result of the changes introduced into existing 
election law in 2008 and the subsequent measures 
taken in 2012, all Turkish citizens over the age of 18 
gained the right to vote at the ballot boxes stationed 
in their countries of residence. Even though Turkish 
citizens have been able to vote in Turkish elections 
since 1987, this was only possible at the ballot sta-
tions installed at Turkish airports and border controls. 
New changes introduced into the election law thus 
significantly eased the financial and logistical bur-
dens of voting. Since the presidential elections in 
2014, when the electorate for the first time cast their 
votes in their countries of residence, voting has 
become a frequent practice, as Turkey has had three 
parliamentary elections, one presidential election, 
and one referendum. 
During the period between 2014 and 2018, the 
number of registered voters abroad increased from 
about 2.8 to 3 million. Around half of the registered 
voters outside of Turkey reside in Germany, where 
the turnout rate increased during the same period, 
from 18.93 percent to 45.7 percent. The ruling Justice 
and Development Party (AKP) and its leader, Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan, garnered the majority of the votes, 
scoring even higher percentages than in Turkey. Simi-
larly, the YES vote in Turkey’s controversial constitu-
tional referendum in 2017 gained a higher share in 
Germany compared to its share in Turkey. The level 
of mass support given to the AKP and President Erdo-
ğan had a considerable effect on the election out-
comes. External votes constituted around 19 percent 
of the total difference between the YES and the NO 
votes in the 2017 referendum. Similarly, President 
Erdoğan’s vote share in the 2018 presidential elec-
tions amounted to 50.8 percent of the total number 
of eligible votes, barely giving him a win in the first 
round. Combined with the 894,585 votes cast for him 
abroad, he won 52.59 percent of the eligible votes. 
The relatively higher vote share that the AKP and 
President Erdoğan garnered in Germany and other 
European states with large Turkish immigration 
levels, such as the Netherlands, Belgium, and Austria, 
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has remained a cause for concern to politicians and 
the public in these countries. Especially in Germany, 
the dominant premise in the public debate has been 
that voting in favor of the AKP and Erdoğan is a sign 
of “loyalty to Turkey” – and thus, of failed integra-
tion – and an absence of a commitment to democratic 
values and norms. 
The new regulations in the election law that 
allowed citizens abroad to vote in their countries of 
residence came in the context of Turkey’s changing 
approach since 2010 to migrants from Turkey and 
their foreign-born children. In the last decade, con-
current with a global increase in diaspora policies, 
the AKP government has systematically designed and 
implemented policies targeting migrants from Turkey 
and their foreign-born children. This new phase has 
seen the creation of new state agencies; an open inter-
est in youth mobilization; a transnational penetration 
by various state and civil society actors into educa-
tional, cultural, and, religious arenas; and, last but 
not least, a broader understanding of the diaspora 
defined by religious unity. For the first time in the 
history of modern Turkey, a separate government 
institution – called the Presidency for Turks Abroad 
and Related Communities (YTB) – was founded in 
2010 under the aegis of the office of the prime minis-
ter to, as stated in its mission statement, foster Turk-
ish migrants’ participation in the societies they live 
in without losing their cultural heritage. Improving 
Turkish language skills and acquiring a good grasp 
of Sunni Muslim teachings and practices are seen as 
essential. A broader approach to welfare provision, 
notably as regards family and education, distin-
guishes the current policies. 
In fact, outside of Turkey, the AKP’s competitive 
advantage over opposition parties has been derived to 
a significant extent from its claimed ownership over 
the policies targeting migrants from Turkey and their 
foreign-born children. Such a claim owes its power 
to the increasingly blurred boundaries between the 
political party and the state institutions. 
Increasingly close contact between the party, state 
institutions, and civil society actors has created a 
patronage network that includes old and new asso-
ciations with close ties to the AKP government, such 
as the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs 
(DITIB) and the Union of European Turkish Democrats 
(renamed in 2018 as the Union of International 
Democrats, UID), respectively. 
Concerted policies targeting the everyday needs of 
migrants from Turkey and their foreign-born children 
– together with the discourse of a strong state adopted 
by, and represented in, the persona of a charismatic 
leader such as Erdoğan – resonate well with the al-
ready existing demands of migrants. Since the 1990s, 
Turkish migrants have voiced two main concerns in 
meetings with Turkish politicians: better and more 
representation within Turkey; and a better organized 
associational realm in Germany that would address 
and cater to the social, cultural, and political needs of 
migrants, and thus, contribute to their social standing 
within Germany. Against this background, the strong 
and broad appeal that the AKP and Erdoğan garner 
among migrants and their Germany-born children 
has both a material and an emotional basis. Socio-eco-
nomic changes and perceived improvements in the 
quality of state institutions, both within Turkey and 
Germany, seem to have created a positive image of 
the party. In addition, a strong sense of pride arising 
out of the perception of a “strong Turkey” under the 
leadership of President Erdoğan seems to drive elec-
toral support. Finally, a fear of losing social and polit-
ical gains also facilitates electoral support to the AKP. 
Given that the interest of the Turkish government 
in the migrant population is driven by its foreign- and 
domestic-policy ambitions, it is likely to continue in 
the future with a strong identitarian focus. Moreover, 
Turkey’s deepening economic crisis is also likely to 
accentuate the need for economic remittances. For 
policy-makers and politicians, the most essential 
starting point should be to differentiate between the 
Turkish government’s systematic efforts to instru-
mentalize migrants and their foreign-born children 
toward its domestic- and foreign-policy ends and the 
demands of migrants. Addressing these demands, 
which are mainly centered around claims for political 
representation and equal recognition, is not easy at a 
time when populist claims and anti-immigrant senti-
ments in Germany and elsewhere in Europe are on 
the rise. However, the challenge should not stop 
policy-makers from developing policies that address 
these concerns. Granting migrants from Turkey and 
their Germany-born children the right to vote in local 
elections is vital. Furthermore, the question of politi-
cal representation should not be confined solely to 
voting rights. Migrant associations are influential 
actors in making claims on behalf of migrants. Given 
the increasing influence of the Turkish state in the 
associational landscape, institutional autonomy should 
be highly encouraged. Last, but not least, political 
actors should also be wary of exclusionary discourses 
against Islam and against practicing Muslims. 
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Migration from Turkey to Germany has a long his-
tory, going back to the arrival of the “guest workers” 
in the early 1960s. Even though economic motivation 
was the primary driver behind this first phase of 
migration, catalysts have diversified over the decades 
in parallel to political and socio-economic develop-
ments in Turkey. Especially around the 1980 coup 
d’état and throughout the 1990s, accelerating politi-
cal suppression, particularly against leftist and 
Kurdish dissent, led to an increase in the number 
of asylum seekers and political exiles from Turkey. 
Around the same time, there was a broad pattern of 
“sporadic migration” of highly skilled laborers and 
students, which continued in the decades to come.1 
Most recently, the unprecedented purge in the after-
math of the July 15 putsch in 2016 opened a new 
chapter in the history of both political and economic 
migration from Turkey to Germany. 
Almost half a century later following the arrival 
of “guest workers” in Germany, migrants from Turkey 
and their children make up the country’s largest 
migrant population today,2 amounting to approxi-
mately 2.9 million.3 Of this total, 52.2 percent have 
been born in Germany. The population is relatively 
young, with those between the ages 20 and 40 con-
stituting 48 percent of the total. The male to female 
ratio is close to 1:1, with males constituting 51.5 per-
cent of the total population. With regard to legal 
 
1 See Thomas Krumm, Germany’s Turkish Voters – What Do 
We Know? (Istanbul: Turkish-German University, 2018). 
2 Of the more than six million Turkish citizens living out-
side of Turkey, around 5.5 million reside in Western Europe. 
See the website of the Turkish Foreign Ministry: http://www. 
mfa.gov.tr/the-expatriate-turkish-citizens.en.mfa (accessed 
1 December 2018). 
3 See Migration Report 2015 (Nürnberg: Bundesamt für Mi-
gration und Flüchtlinge) (in German), https://www.bamf.de/ 
SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Publikationen/Migrationsberichte/ 
migrationsbericht-2015.pdf?__blob=publicationFile (accessed 
1 December 2018). 
status, approximately half of the population has only 
Turkish citizenship, whereby those with only German 
citizenship amount to around 800,000 and those with 
dual citizenship are estimated to be around 530,000.4 
Diversification of Migration Patterns 
Workers from Turkey started arriving in Germany 
and elsewhere in Europe in the 1960s in the context 
of the Labor Recruitment Agreements. Labor agree-
ments were signed with Germany in 1961; Austria, 
Belgium, and the Netherlands in 1964; France in 
1965; and Sweden in 1967.5 The global oil crisis in 
1973 led to a decrease in the demand for foreign 
workers, halting the labor agreement with Germany. 
Nevertheless, Turkish migrants continued to arrive 
(although in considerably smaller numbers) until the 
1980s, mostly in the context of family unification. 
During this time, a total of 790,289 migrants arrived 
in various European countries.6 Of these, 648,029 
came to Germany.7 
Guest workers from Turkey consisted of ethnic 
Turks and Kurds who were mostly coming from rural 
 
4 See Christoph Sydow, “German-Turkish: Debates on 
the Dual Citizenship – These Are the Facts” (in German), 
Der Spiegel, 5 August 2016, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ 
deutschland/deutschtuerken-doppelte-staatsbuergerschaft-
das-sind-die-fakten-a-1106363.html (accessed 5 December 
2018). 
5 Yurdakul notes that there was already a small amount 
of Turkish workers in Germany working in the shipment 
industry before the labor agreements. See Gökçe Yurdakul, 
From Guest Workers into Muslims: The Transformation of Turkish 
Immigrant Associations in Germany (New Castle: Cambridge 
Scholars Publishing, 2009), 24. 
6 See https://media.iskur.gov.tr/21271/dundenbugunei 
skur.pdf (retrieved from the Turkish Employment Agency 
[İŞKUR], accessed 1 December 2018). 
7 Ibid. 
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areas in Turkey. Families started arriving in the 1970s 
following the new provisions introduced in 1969 
about family unifications into the Law on European 
Economic Community Residence. The voluntary 
return programs implemented by the Helmut Kohl 
government in 1983–1984 resulted in the return 
of some economic migrants, but the numbers at the 
time remained negligible.8 Over time, around half of 
the population who came to Germany between 1961 
and the 1990s returned to Turkey.9 By the late 1980s, 
it became clear both to German and Turkish author-
ities that a considerable percentage of the economic 
migrants who initially came on a temporary basis 
would stay and not go back to Turkey. 
In the case of asylum-seekers, the very question 
of staying was undoubtedly less ambiguous. Asylum-
seekers started arriving in Germany as early as the 
1970s, at a time of intense political turmoil in Turkey 
marked by severe ideological clashes. Numerous 
leftist activists went into exile in Germany during this 
time. Yet, a mass arrival of asylum-seekers did not 
take place until the takeover by the military in 1980. 
Political migration from Turkey continued during the 
1990s; yet, this time it was mostly Kurdish citizens 
who were displaced during the armed conflict be-
tween the Turkish army and members of the Kurdish 
militia, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), seeking 
refuge in Germany. 
Even though Turkish politics entered into a rela-
tively quiet and seemingly stable phase with the rise 
of the AKP to power as a single-party government in 
2002, socio-political conflicts started to resurface in 
the late 2000s, culminating in what would turn out to 
be the most suppressive governance in the history of 
contemporary Turkey. The July 15 putsch in 2016 – 
and the subsequent purge that was even more ex-
pansive and extensive than its predecessor following 
the 1980 coup – has led to yet another phase of 
political migration.10 Besides asylum-seekers, numer-
ous academics, artists, and journalists are currently 
in Germany, mostly on temporary residence permits. 
Moreover, in line with the current brain drain from 
 
8 Yurdakul, From Guestworkers into Muslims (see note 5), 38. 
9 Yaşar Aydın, The New Turkish Diaspora Policy: Its Aims, Their 
Limits and the Challenges for Associations of People of Turkish Origin 
and Decision-makers in Germany, SWP Research Paper 10 (Ber-
lin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, October 2014). 
10 For the updated post-coup purge figures, see https:// 
turkeypurge.com/?fbclid=IwAR1tBi_JQ87xWbec1GqHQSr9 
BT4V1fjCMMdH8FnLHylJupkbr28Qkdr4uSg (accessed 10 De-
cember 2018). 
Turkey and the rapidly deepening economic crisis,11 
many highly skilled workers have also arrived in the 
last few years. The future predicament of these new-
comers – whether they will remain in Germany or 
not – for the moment remains ambiguous, as does 
the future of Turkey. 
Changes in associational engagements 
Along with the diversification of migration patterns 
and, as a result, an increasingly diverse population, 
migrants’ associational engagements have also varied 
and changed. Over the decades, the associational 
landscape has witnessed the emergence of myriad 
organizations with different political orientations and 
motivations. Moreover, migrants themselves have 
become more organized around issues that concern 
their lives in Germany. Most recently, in the last 
decade, the associational landscape has taken on a 
noticeably new character with the penetration of 
various pro-AKP organizations. 
Historically, numerous spaces have been active 
in the socialization of migrants and their children. 
Among these are coffee shops, mosques, and various 
forms of organizations including neighborhood, 
hometown, and migrant associations. Since the 1960s, 
Turkish politics has been a topic of interest for many, 
regardless of their political orientations. Events on 
Turkish politics, such as public talks, lectures, memo-
rial events, and demonstrations, are not uncommon. 
Given the ethnically, religiously, and ideologically 
diverse nature of the population, these events span a 
wide range of areas and topics: from the celebration 
of national holidays to genocide commemoration. 
Notwithstanding the general interest in Turkish 
politics, it is difficult to infer a direct relation to col-
lective mobilization on the basis of such a tendency. 
In other words, an interest in Turkish politics does 
not necessarily translate into a willingness and ability 
to organize and mobilize crowds around causes 
related to Turkish politics. The latter most often goes 
hand in hand with the degree and form of associa-
tional engagement. According to the activity report 
in 2007–2008 of the Turkish Parliament’s Human 
Rights Sub-Commission around twenty percent of 
 
11 “Spurning Erdoğan’s Vision, Turks Leave in Droves, 
Draining Money and Talent”, New York Times, 2 January 2019, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/02/world/europe/turkey-
emigration-Erdoğan.html (accessed 13 February 2019). 
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Turkish migrants in Germany were estimated to be 
organized.12 
Over the last five to six decades, 
the civic capacity of migrants from 
Turkey and their children has 
developed considerably. 
Over the last five to six decades, the civic capacity 
of migrants from Turkey and their children has devel-
oped considerably. Throughout the 1970s, labor 
unions and landsmannschaftliche organizations over-
whelmed the associational realm.13 This situation 
started to change in the late 1970s with the founding 
of new organizations and the diversification of 
political orientations.14 Noteworthy is that this was 
also when the Turkish state stepped into the asso-
ciational realm. Some of the new associations estab-
lished, such as the Föderation der Türkisch-Demokra-
tischen Idealistenvereine in Deutschland e.V. (ATF) 
and DITIB, were closely tied to the Turkish state. The 
ATF was founded in 1978 to counter the activities of 
Kurdish associations and the PKK.15 Similarly, DITIB 
was founded in 1984 to counter the powerful position 
in Germany of Islamist groups such as the Islamic 
Community Milli Görüş (IGMG, Islamische Gemein-
schaft Milli Görüş) and the Federation of Islamic 
Cultural Centers (VIKZ, Verband Islamischer Kultur-
zentren of the religious order called Süleymancılar), 
which, at the time, were both considered by Turkey 
as radical groups.16 
 
12 See the Human Rights Sub-Commission of the Turkish 
Parliament (in Turkish): https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/komisyon/ 
insanhaklari/belge/Komisyon_Faaliyet_Raporu.pdf (accessed 
1 December 2018). 
13 These organizations are mostly coffeehouses registered 
as e.V. (eingetragener Vereine – registered organizations). 
Mostly male spaces, landsmannschaftliche organizations, con-
tinue to play an important role in the socialization of Turk-
ish migrants. See Yurdakul, From Guestworkers into Muslims 
(see note 5), 34. 
14 Yurdakul, From Guestworkers into Muslims (see note 5), 34. 
Here, I only focus on associations with ties to the Turkish 
state. One should bear in mind that the associational land-
scape is much more diverse. 
15 Alynna J. Lyon and Emek M. Uçarer, “Mobilizing Ethnic 
Conflict: Kurdish Separatism in Germany and the PKK”, 
Ethnic and Racial Studies 24, no. 6 (2001): 925–48. 
16 Günter Seufert, “Die ‘Türkisch-Islamische Union’ (DITB) 
der türkischen Religionsbehörde”, in Turkish Islam and Europe, 
ed. Günter Seufert and Jacques Waardenburg (Istanbul and 
Stuttgart, 1999), 261–93. On German–Turkey cooperation 
Changes in the associational realm were, however, 
not limited to the expansion and diversification of 
organizations. They also involved a shift in claims-
making practices. Even though, at the beginning, 
concerns related to Turkey overwhelmed association-
al practices, this started to change in the late 1980s/ 
early 1990s as concerns around living in Germany 
gained prominence.17 Influential in this shift were 
two factors: the growing understanding among 
migrants themselves that their stay would be per-
manent, and the changing socio-economic and socio-
political conditions in Germany, especially following 
unification.18 Migrant associations have – regardless 
of their political orientation and their degree of close-
ness to the Turkish state – increasingly focused on 
issues that concern migrants in Germany. For in-
stance, DITIB and the IGMG swiftly developed a the-
matic focus on discrimination, mostly understood 
and expressed in relation to religion and religious 
differences. 
In addition to the expansion and diversification 
of the associational realm since the late 1970s – not 
only in terms of the type of organizations but also 
with regard to the type of claims made – the asso-
ciational landscape gained a new dimension in the 
early 2000s with the founding of pro-AKP organiza-
tions such as the UID; the Foundation for Political, 
Economic and Social Research (SETA); and the Yunus 
Emre Foundation and Yunus Emre cultural centers. 
These organizations have been effective in mobilizing 
migrants in favor of the AKP and President Erdoğan. 
Moreover, they also actively work toward forming and 
influencing public opinion abroad about the AKP. 
For instance, the UID was founded in 2004 in 
Cologne as a lobby organization for the AKP with the 
support of the then–Prime Minister Erdoğan.19 It 
has offices all over Europe, 15 of which are based in 
Germany. As stated on its website, the UID aims to 
promote the preservation of cultural and linguistic 
 
curtailing political Islam, also see Behlul Ozkan, “Cold-war 
Era Relations between West Germany and Turkish Political 
Islam: From an Anti-communist Alliance to a Domestic Secu-
rity Issue”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 19, no. 1 
(2019): 31–54. 
17 Demir Küçükaydın, In the Memory of Those Who Left 
(in Turkish) (Istanbul, 2013). 
18 Yurdakul, From Guestworkers into Muslims (see note 5), 38. 
19 “The Lobby behind Turkey’s Prime Minister”, Deutsche 
Welle, 21 May 2014, https://www.dw.com/en/the-lobby-
behind-turkeys-prime-minister/a-17652516 (accessed 10 De-
cember 2018). 
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heritage. At the same, it is also tasked with encourag-
ing the active participation of migrants from Turkey 
and their children in the societies where they now 
live. These two objectives echo the general position 
advocated by Erdoğan and AKP officials to promote 
“integration but not assimilation.”20 The board mem-
bers of the UID often appear in discussions aired on 
Turkish TV channels broadcasting abroad, such as 
TRT Avrupa and Kanal Avrupa. The UID also plays 
an active role in the organization of the rallies and 
speeches of Turkish political actors in Europe as well 
as in the mobilization of the constituents during 
elections. 
Currently presided over by Erdoğan’s extended 
family members,21 SETA, on the other hand, was con-
ceived by former president Abdullah Gül and initiated 
in 2005 by the ousted prime minister, Ahmet Davu-
toğlu, as a prestigious partisan think tank.22 The 
current spokesperson to President Erdoğan, Ibrahim 
Kalın, served as its founding director while still 
holding close ties to Davutoğlu. SETA has offices in 
Ankara, Istanbul, Washington DC, Cairo, and Berlin 
and regularly publishes pro-AKP opinion pieces and 
reports about Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies. 
As such, the think tank actively aims at exerting an 
influence on public opinion and political debates. 
 
20 “Assimilation Is a Crime against Humanity” (in Ger-
man), Süddeutsche Zeitung, 17 May 2010, https://www. 
sueddeutsche.de/politik/erdogan-rede-in-koeln-im-wortlaut-
assimilation-ist-ein-verbrechen-gegen-die-menschlichkeit-
1.293718 (accessed 23 April 2019). 
21 “President Erdoğan Was Gifted with a Kriter Painting” 
(in Turkish), Kriter, February 2017, https://kriterdergi.com/ 
siyaset/cumhurbaskani-erdogana-kriter-kapakli-tablo-hediye-
edildi (accessed 23 April 2019). 
22 “Erdoğan’s Defence against Liberal Muslims in Berlin” 
(in German), Tagesspiegel, 4 April 2019, https://www. 
tagesspiegel.de/berlin/tuerkisches-institut-Erdoğans-
abwehreinheit-gegen-liberale-muslime-in-berlin/24184860. 
html (accessed 23 April 2019). 
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Along with the changes in the associational realm, 
Turkey’s relationship with migrants from Turkey and 
their foreign-born children has also altered since the 
1960s. Numerous factors – such as perceptions about 
the temporal nature of migration from Turkey, 
changing security and foreign policy concerns of the 
Turkish state, and last, but not least, the demands of 
the migrants themselves – have influenced Turkish 
policy-making toward migrants from Turkey and 
their children. Three distinct phases mark the policy 
changes and developments. 
Temporary Stay: Economic and 
Social Remittances 
Economic migration from Turkey to Germany was 
initially based on the rotation principle. Workers 
were expected to return to Turkey at the end of their 
first year in Germany. Even though the principle 
failed to work in practice, it would not be an exag-
geration to say that the perception that it generated 
about the temporal character of economic migration 
significantly shaped the nature of relations between 
Turkish authorities and the migrant population. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the main driving force 
was economic and social remittances.23 Until 1971, 
the Turkish Employment Agency (İŞKUR) and the 
consulates acted as the primary government institu-
tions coordinating relations with the migrant popu-
lation. In 1971, the Presidency of Religious Affairs 
(Diyanet) became another actor, mainly responsible 
 
23 Damla Aksel, “Turkey’s Migrants and the Change in 
Policies” (in Turkish), İç Politika, 3 November 2016. 
for the provision of imams and other religious repre-
sentatives.24 
Toward Permanent Stay and Turkey’s 
Increasing Security Concerns 
The changing nature of migration from Turkey 
around the 1980 coup d’état and the realization that 
guest workers might indeed not return to Turkey 
caused a shift in government policies. “Citizens living 
abroad” became a popular term during this time, 
used to refer to migrants from Turkey and their 
children.25 In this second phase of policy-making, 
unlike the preceding period, the Turkish state became 
more involved in the lives of migrants. This shift in 
the policy outlook was expressed in Article 62 of the 
1982 Constitution, drafted under the auspices of 
the military. Accordingly, the “state could [can] take 
necessary steps to ensure family unity, the education 
of children, the cultural needs and the social security 
of Turkish nationals working abroad, and could [can] 
also take the necessary measures to reinforce their 
ties with the home country, in addition to assisting 
them on their return to home.”26 
Issues such as dual citizenship, welfare provisions 
for the migrant population, the right to vote, as well 
 
24 Kerem Öktem, Turkey’s New Diaspora Policy: The Challenge, 
Inclusivity, Outreach and Capacity (Istanbul Policy Center, 2014). 
25 Aksel, “Turkey’s Migrants and the Change in Policies” 
(see note 23). The term “Euro-Turks” also became popular 
in the 1990s. Also see Aydın, The New Turkish Diaspora Policy 
(see note 9), 9. 
26 Zeynep Sahin Mencütek and Bahar Baser, “Mobilizing 
Diasporas: Insights from Turkey’s Attempts to Reach Turkish 
Citizens Abroad”, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 20, 
no. 1 (2018): 86–105. 
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as the provision of language and religion classes in 
the countries of residence became central to the 
communication exchange between Turkish political 
actors and migrants, especially throughout the 
1990s.27 During this time, the Ministry of Education 
emerged as a new actor partaking in the coordination 
of policies, especially in the realms of language and 
religious education.28 Moreover, with the introduc-
tion of the “Pink Card” in 1995, Turkish citizens who 
had to renounce their citizenship to obtain German 
citizenship gained the same residence, travel, and 
work rights that were granted to Turkish citizens. 
However, Pink Cards did not extend the right of 
political representation or public employment.29 
In addition to the changing perception about the 
temporality of the migrants’ situation, the Turkish 
state’s security concerns were also influential in 
changing the nature of the relevant policies. It was 
already noted earlier that DITIB was founded in 1984 
to counter the powerful position of Islamist groups 
in Germany such as the IGMG and the VIKZ, which, 
at the time, were considered by Turkey as radical 
groups. Curtailing the influence of these groups 
was, however, not the only function of DITIB. It also 
assumed the task of directly providing religious and 
cultural services to the migrant population.30 In a 
way, this constituted a shift from the earlier period, 
when Diyanet had taken care of the same task while 
based in Turkey. Despite this spatial shift, however, 
DITIB has had close ties with the Turkish Diyanet since 
its founding. The President of Diyanet serves as the 
honorary chairman and the Chairman of the Advisory 
Board of DITIB.31 The organization is officially presided 
 
27 Reports are available (in Turkish) at: https://www. 
tbmm.gov.tr/komisyon/insanhaklari/index.htm (accessed 
20 November 2018). 
28 Eva Østergaard-Nielsen, Transnational Politics: Turks and 
Kurds in Germany (London: Routledge, 2003). 
29 Mencütek and Baser, “Mobilizing Diasporas” (see note 
26), 92. 
30 Matthias Rohe, Report on the Religious Instruction at Public 
Schools in Hessen in Cooperation with DITIB (in German) (2017), 
18–38. Website of the Ministry of Education, Federated 
State of Hessen, https://www.hessen.de/sites/default/files/ 
media/prof._dr._mathias_rohe_-_islamwissenschaftliches_ 
gutachten_ditib_hessen_fuer_hkm_2017.pdf (accessed 1 De-
cember 2018). Also see Islamic Organizations in Europe and the 
USA: A Multidisciplinary Perspective, ed. Matthias Kortmann and 
Kerstin Rosenow-Williams (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 
2013). 
31 See Rohe, Report on the Religious Instruction (see note 30), 22. 
over by a high-ranking Diyanet official who is sent 
abroad as a religious attaché of the Turkish embassy 
and appointed to serve a four-year term. Moreover, 
imams are sent to Germany from Turkey as well.32 
Even though the second phase of Turkish policy-
making was overwhelmingly shaped by the above-
mentioned supply-driven factors, that is, a changing 
perception about the temporality of the migrants’ 
situation and changing security concerns of the Turk-
ish state, it is important to not overlook the demands 
of migrants as well. Throughout the 1990s, during 
their meetings with Turkish officials, migrants often 
voiced a strong interest in the Turkish state’s active 
involvement in addressing their concerns in Germa-
ny. The minutes of the meetings that took place in 
Berlin in December 1992 between Turkish authorities 
and the migrants validate this. The decision of the 
Turkish authorities to travel to Germany was trig-
gered by the deadly attacks in Mölln that targeted 
Turkish citizens earlier that same year. Central to the 
meeting were issues such as “the lack of equal recog-
nition in Germany despite having lived for almost 
thirty years in Germany,” “the security problem,” “the 
lack of political participation especially in the local 
elections in Germany,” and “discriminatory attitudes 
within German society.”33 The activity report of the 
Turkish Parliament’s Human Rights Sub-Commission, 
which organized the meetings, concluded that there 
was a strong demand within the population for the 
“Turkish state, parliament and affiliated institutions, 
as well as media to actively engage with and support 
citizens abroad.”34 
Toward Making a Muslim “Diaspora”: 
Government–Civil Society Partnership 
The period between the mid-1980s and the early 
2000s witnessed a turn in the Turkish state’s attitude 
in the form of depicting problems and policy areas. 
The aim was to address the needs of the migrant 
population – not only for issues concerning Turkey 
but also those concerning their countries of residence 
– as well as to counter the activities of groups that 
Turkey considered to be radical at the time. Given the 
 
32 See Yurdakul, From Guest Workers to Muslims (see note 5), 89. 
33 See https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/komisyon/insanhaklari/ 
docs/21dnm/mart1_1991_agustos30_1992.pdf (accessed 1 De-
cember 2018), 60–70. 
34 Ibid. 
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highly volatile political situation in Turkey, however, 
the latter focus overrode the former, rendering policy-
making disorganized. Only in the late 2000s did an 
institutionally organized policy-making, in accord-
ance with the global surge in diaspora policies, start 
to gain prominence.35 Lobbying was used as a tool to 
remake the national community outside of Turkey’s 
borders along religious-cultural lines and to further 
foreign policy interests, thereby complementing and 
perhaps even motivating this institutionalized policy 
outlook. The last decade of policy-making in this 
respect marks another important juncture. Such a 
change can be observed in the increasing deploy-
ment – both in government documents and also in 
academic writings – of the term “diaspora” when 
referring to migrants from Turkey and their foreign-
born children. The main feature of this third phase 
is the formation of a Muslim (and Turkish) diaspora, 
on the one hand, and advocating the social, economic, 
and political participation of migrants into their 
countries of residence, on the other hand. 
For the first time in the history of the Turkish 
Republic, a separate government institution was 
founded in 2010 in order to plan, coordinate, and 
implement policies and programs targeting Turkish 
citizens abroad, “kinship communities” broadly 
defined by religious unity, and international students. 
The YTB was established in 2010 under the aegis of 
the office of the prime minister, which was abolished 
under Turkey’s new presidential system, and now 
operates under the Ministry of Culture and Tourism.36 
Its organizational structure includes nine units.37 
Among these, the strategy development, personnel, 
and support services units are managed by the YTB’s 
president. Besides the president, there are two vice 
presidents, each of whom manages three of the re-
maining six units: Citizens Abroad, Cultural and 
Social Relations, Institutional Relations and Commu-
nication, International Students, Information Tech-
 
35 Francesco Ragazzi, “A Comparative Analysis of Diaspora 
Policies”, Political Geography 41 (2015): 74–89. 
36 Website of the State News Agency TRT Haber, “Three 
Organizations Now Operate under the Ministry of Tourism 
and Culture” (in Turkish), 15 July 2018, https://www.trthaber. 
com/haber/gundem/kultur-ve-turizm-bakanligina-uc-yeni-
kurulus-baglandi-375391.html (accessed 23 April 2019). 
37 For the organizational structure of the YTB, see https:// 
www.ytb.gov.tr/teskilat-semasi (accessed 23 April 2019). 
nology, and Legal Units. In 2017, the YTB employed 
a total of 287 part- and full-time workers.38 
The organization has three main objectives con-
cerning its activities targeting Turkish citizens 
abroad:39 i) improving the sense of belonging in the 
homeland; ii) preservation of the mother tongue as 
well as culture, and identity; and iii) improving the 
social standing of the Turkish diaspora in their coun-
tries of residence. According to an interview conducted 
in 2014 with the then-head of the organization, these 
three objectives are expected to contribute to the for-
mation of an “active citizenship” that will foster the 
participation of Turkish migrants in the societies 
where they live without them having to lose their 
cultural heritage.40 
Accordingly, the YTB’s activities fall under the 
following themes: education and Turkish language; 
cultural mobility; human rights and law; family and 
social services; civil initiatives; economy and employ-
ment; and pre-school bilingual training.41 An over-
whelming majority of these activities cater to youth 
(mainly those who were born in the 1990s) and chil-
dren. Activities in the area of education include 
weekend schools; an MA program in affiliated uni-
versities in Turkey to train Turkish language instruc-
tors to be sent abroad; fellowships for citizens abroad 
to support research on the migrant population and 
to support academic and intellectual participation; 
special quotas in Turkish universities for the migrant 
population; human rights education programs in 
Turkey; and last but not least, pre-school bilingual 
education programs. 
In addition, the YTB also organizes – within the 
context of the cultural mobility theme – heritage 
trips to Turkey, such as the Evliya Çelebi Anatolia 
Culture Events; internships for Turkish migrant youth 
at Turkish government institutions; the diaspora 
youth academy, which started its activities in 2013; a 
special quota for Turkish migrant youth at the annual 
camps organized by the Ministry of Education; and 
youth camps that are organized in Turkey specifically 
for Turkish youth abroad. 
 
38 YTB, Organization’s Activity Report (2017), https://ytbweb1. 
blob.core.windows.net/files/documents/2017_FAAL__YET_ 
RAPORU_Digital.pdf (accessed 23 April 2019). 
39 Aydın, The New Turkish Diaspora Policy (see note 9). 
40 “Human Right and Universal Values Cannot Be Con-
fined to the Borders of One Country!” (in Turkish), Perspektif 
236 (December 2014): 38–41. Perspektif is the monthly maga-
zine published by the IGMG. 
41 YTB, Organization’s Activity Report (see note 38), 40–47. 
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Besides the activities listed above, the YTB has also 
recently started providing two particular fellowships: 
one for developing expertise in legal issues around 
discrimination, and the other for the provision of 
family and social services, which have increasingly 
become a focal point of diaspora policies in the last 
couple of years. The Ministry of Family and Social 
Policies, for instance, opened attachés in Düsseldorf 
and Cologne in 2015 within the institutional struc-
ture of the Turkish consulates.42 These offices argu-
ably contribute to the extension of welfare provisions 
outside of Turkey’s borders. The migrant population 
and their children are entitled, for instance, to birth 
and child support, which were enacted in Turkey in 
2015.43 
All of these activities provided by the YTB are 
available to Turkish citizens abroad and to Blue Card 
holders alike. In line with the new changes intro-
duced to the citizenship law in 2009, the Blue Card 
has replaced what previously used to be the Pink 
Card.44 The former preserves the rights that the latter 
had already granted to those who renounced their 
citizenship with the permission of the Turkish state. 
In contrast to the Pink Card, however, the Blue Card 
extends the right to public employment in Turkey on 
a temporary and contractual basis. Moreover, the Blue 
Card holders can make use of the state contribution 
to voluntary pension schemes if they choose to enroll 
in a scheme that is based in Turkey. They can also 
enroll on a voluntary basis in social insurance and 
pension schemes in Turkey. 
The YTB organizes these activities in cooperation 
with various ministries in Turkey, including the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Family 
and Social Policies. Diyanet and DITIB are also active 
participants in YTB projects.45 The main emphasis 
in the design and implementation of projects is the 
partnership with civil society organizations, both in 
Turkey and abroad. The usual procedure is that civil 
society organizations, including universities, apply to 
be project partners. The Presidency provides funding 
and institutional support. One example is the coopera-
tion agreement that the YTB signed with Sakarya Uni-
 
42 “Family Attachés Are Being Opened in Four Cities 
in Germany” (in Turkish), Hürriyet, 12 March 2017.  
43 “Can Mothers Abroad Apply for Birth Support?” 
(in Turkish), Diaspora Haber, 16 July 2018.  
44 See http://www.mfa.gov.tr/mavi-kart-_eski-pembe-kart_-
uygulamasi-.tr.mfa (accessed 10 December 2018). 
45 YTB, Organization’s Activity Report (see note 38), 50–51. 
versity in Turkey to start an MA program to train 
Turkish language instructors.46 Those who have com-
pleted their undergraduate degrees abroad in educa-
tion and social sciences can apply to the program. 
Another such project is the pre-school bilingual edu-
cation project, which was proposed to the YTB in 
2014 by the European Research Center at Akdeniz 
University. In the context of the same project, the 
YTB also cooperated with Alice Salomon University 
of Applied Sciences Berlin.47 
Interestingly, the emphasis on the YTB’s activities 
on civil society partnerships seems to address an exist-
ing demand among migrants that was often voiced in 
their meetings with Turkish officials throughout the 
1990s. Even though the civic capacities of migrants 
significantly developed in the 1980s and 1990s, as 
mentioned earlier, the associational realm remained 
divided along ideological, ethnic, and religious cleav-
ages. The necessity to have unified and better organ-
ized Turkish civil society actors geared toward more 
effective claims-making was a pressing concern 
among migrants during the 1990s. For instance, this 
demand was voiced during a visit by Turkish Mem-
bers of Parliament (MPs) in November 1999. During 
the visit of the Turkish MPs in February 2001, a 
request to start a Turkish Council was also voiced. 
Even though the demand for a more unified civil 
society continues,48 the systematization and institu-
tionalization of policy-making through the activities 
of the YTB and with the participation of civil society 
actors were arguably timely, strategic moves to ad-
dress the prevailing concerns. 
 
46 Ibid., 44–45. 
47 Ibid., 42–43. 
48 TV Channel Kanal Avrupa, 13 October 2018, Perspective 
(in Turkish), TV discussion with Tamer Cansız, the General 
Secretary of the UID, and Gönül Eğlence, the head of the 
Essen organization of the Alliance 90/The Greens, https:// 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=EBs2L-WRte0 (accessed 10 De-
cember 2018). 
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The introduction of voting from abroad should be 
understood within the context of this third phase 
of policy-making. Changes introduced into existing 
election law in 2008, and the subsequent completion 
in 2012 of the necessary measures, made voting at the 
ballot boxes stationed in the countries of residence 
possible for all Turkish passport holders over the age 
of 18.49 Even though Turkish citizens living abroad 
had been eligible to vote since 1987, turnout rates re-
mained low due to financial and logistical difficulties 
of people having to cast their votes at the ballot sta-
tions installed at Turkish airports and border controls. 
External voting became a pressing 
demand during the 1990s, often 
voiced by migrants in their encounters 
with Turkish government officials. 
In fact, external voting became a pressing demand 
during the 1990s, often voiced by migrants in their 
encounters with Turkish government officials.50 The 
first provision for voting abroad was introduced on 
July 23, 1995, following a constitutional amendment 
approved by the coalition government of the time.51 
Even though this amendment allowed Turkish citi-
zens abroad to vote, the required additional electoral 
legislation for determining applicable measures for 
its implementation was not pursued by the political 
actors at the time. Only in 2012 did all the necessary 
 
49 Amendments to the Election Law, Law No. 5749, dated 
March 13, 2008, available at http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/ 
eskiler/2008/03/20080322M1-3.htm (accessed 27 May 2019). 
Also see Zeynep Sahin Mencütek and Seyma Akyol Yılmaz, 
Turkey’s Experience with Voting from Abroad in the 2014 and 2015 
Elections, Rethink Paper 24 (Washington, D.C.: Rethink Insti-
tute, October 2015), 3.  
50 One of the earliest official records of the demand by citi-
zens abroad for the right to vote was a parliamentary pro-
posal in 1971 entitled “Workers Abroad and Problems”. See 
Zeynep Sahin Mencütek and M. Murat Erdogan, “The Imple-
mentation of Voting from Abroad: Evidence from the 2014 Turkish 
Presidential Election”, International Migration, 54(3), 2016, 178. 
51 Ibid. 
measures come to a completion. During the 2014 
presidential elections, Turkish citizens abroad cast 
their votes for the first time at the ballot boxes sta-
tioned in their countries of residence. 
Voting Behavior in Numbers52 
Since then, they have voted in three parliamentary 
elections (June 7, 2015; November 1, 2015, and June 
24, 2018), one presidential election (June 24, 2018), 
and one referendum (April 16, 2017). The number of 
registered voters abroad increased between the 2014 
presidential election and the June 2018 presidential 
and parliamentary elections, from about 2.8 million 
to 3 million. During the same period, the voter turn-
out rate abroad also increased, from 18.9 percent to 
50 percent. Around half of the registered voters out-
side of Turkey reside in Germany, where the number 
of registered voters remained relatively stable during 
the period between 2014 and 2018; yet the turnout 
rate, parallel to the overall trend abroad, considerably 
increased. As Table 1 (page 16) demonstrates, only 
18.93 percent53 of the eligible voters in Germany 
voted in the 2014 presidential election, whereby the 
same ratio jumped to 45.7 percent in the 2018 
presidential/parliamentary election. 
Besides this striking increase in the voter turnout 
rate abroad in general – and in Germany, in 
particular – the high vote shares gained abroad by 
both the AKP and the pro-Kurdish and leftist Peoples’ 
Democratic Party (HDP) also deserve attention. In all 
 
52 All the numbers in this section are compiled by the 
author using the statistics available at the website of the 
Higher Election Council in Turkey, http://www.ysk.gov.tr 
(accessed 10 December 2018). The Higher Election Council 
is the main state institution that is responsible for the 
oversight and logistics of elections. 
53 There were 8.15 percent who cast their votes in Germany, 
whereby 10.8 percent did so at the ballot boxes stationed at 
the airports and border transits. The Higher Council of Elec-
tion provides a country breakdown of the actual votes cast at 
the borders only for the 2014 elections. 
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of the three parliamentary elections between 2014 
and 2018, both the AKP and the HDP gained a higher 
share of the votes abroad than they did in Turkey. In 
the June 2018 parliamentary elections, for instance, 
the AKP’s vote share within Turkey was 42.56 per-
cent, whereby it was 51.73 percent abroad. Similarly, 
the HDP gained 11.7 percent of the votes in Turkey, 
whereby its vote share abroad was 17.31 percent. 
A similar trend was also visible in the June and 
November 2015 elections. 
Table 1 
Voter turnout rate in Germany 
2014 presidential 18.93 
June 2015 parliamentary 33.40 
November 2015 parliamentary 39.80 
2017 referendum 45.84 
June 2018 parliamentary and presidential 45.70 
The AKP’s vote share in Germany (similar to that in 
the Netherlands, Belgium, and Austria) was higher 
than its overall vote share abroad. In the June 2018 
elections, the party gained 56.3 percent of the votes 
in Germany (63.35 percent in the Netherlands, 65.08 
percent in Belgium, and 63.24 percent in Austria). 
The trend was similar in the June 2015 elections as 
well, with the AKP gaining 53.65 percent of the votes 
in Germany (and between 60 and 65 percent in the 
Netherlands, Belgium, and Austria).54 
Within Germany, on the other hand, the AKP won 
the highest share of votes in all the consular areas, as 
can be seen in Table 2: as low as 44 percent (in Berlin 
during June 7, 2015 elections) and as high as 70 per-
cent (in Münster in November 1, 2015 elections). The 
second most-popular party across Germany was either 
the main opposition party, the Republican People’s 
Party (CHP), or the HDP. On the other hand, the vote 
 
54 The HDP, on the other hand, gained significantly more 
votes in Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, and the United King-
dom than its average votes abroad. In the June 2018 elec-
tions, the HDP’s vote share was 37.27 percent in Sweden, 
40.96 percent in Switzerland, 48.2 percent in Finland, and 
49.34 percent in the United Kingdom. A similar trend was 
also seen in the June 2015 elections, with the HDP gaining 
43.19 percent of the votes in Sweden, 47.51 percent in 
Switzerland, 57.8 percent in Finland, and 59.31 percent in 
the United Kingdom. 
share of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), which 
went into an alliance with the AKP in the 2018 elec-
tions, has fluctuated within the range of 7–11 per-
cent. 
Why Are External Votes Important for 
Political Parties? 
External voting has had an effect on the outcomes of 
both parliamentary and presidential elections as well 
as the 2017 referendum.55 For the latter two, external 
votes are directly added to the total number of votes 
cast within Turkey. Their effects on the outcomes of 
the 2018 presidential elections and the 2017 referen-
dum were significant. For instance, President Erdo-
ğan’s vote share in Turkey in the 2018 presidential 
election amounted to 50.8 percent of the total, barely 
giving him a win in the first round. Combined with 
the 894,585 votes cast for him from abroad, he won 
52.59 percent of the eligible votes. Similarly, external 
votes were also quite influential in the 2017 referen-
dum, constituting around 19 percent (256,000) of the 
total difference (1.37 million votes) between the YES 
and the NO votes. 
For parliamentary elections, votes 
cast abroad have a dual effect. 
For parliamentary elections, votes cast abroad have 
a dual effect. The first concerns the number of parlia-
mentary seats that a party can win. The number of 
valid votes cast from abroad are distributed among 
electoral districts by using the proportion of valid ex-
ternal votes to those of valid internal votes as a base. 
Once the exact number of external votes that each 
district gets is calculated, this number is distributed 
among political parties in proportion to their overall 
vote share abroad. Given that the AKP won the highest 
share of votes abroad – but also higher than what 
it gained within Turkey – it benefited the most from 
external voting. For instance, the votes cast from 
abroad gave the AKP three additional seats in the 
November 2015 parliamentary elections. 
 
55 “Responsibilities of the City Election Councils and Fun-
damentals and Principles of Counting External Votes” (in 
Turkish), Resmi Gazete, 3 April 2015, http://www.resmigazete. 
gov.tr/eskiler/2015/04/20150403-11.pdf (accessed 23 April 
2019). 
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Table 2 
Political parties’ vote share within Germany 
  AKP MHP CHP HDP 
Berlin June 7, 2015 43.92%  8.09% 23.60%  20.48% 
 November 1, 2015 48.46%  6.30% 22.60%  19.48% 
 June 24, 2018 45.30%  6.06% 22.40%  20.12% 
Dusseldorf June 7, 2015 59.49%  11.36% 13.10%  13.58% 
 November 1, 2015 64.60%  8.84% 12.30%  12.56% 
 June 24, 2018 59.85%  9.78% 12.72%  11.66% 
Essen June 7, 2015 61.93%  10.63% 10.53%  14.35% 
 November 1, 2015 67.11%  7.41% 16.18%  12.87% 
 June 24, 2018 66.45%  8.51% 9.43%  10.69% 
Frankfurt June 7, 2015 47.72%  9.80% 17.28%  21.87% 
 November 1, 2015 54.36%  7.41% 16.19%  20.25% 
 June 24, 2018 50.82%  8.38% 17.03%  18.44% 
Hamburg June 7, 2015 50.21%  8.25% 18.02%  20.95% 
 November 1, 2015 54.36%  6.41% 17.07%  19.79% 
 June 24, 2018 50.90%  7.34% 17.24%  19.26% 
Hannover June 7, 2015 47.63%  7.95% 16.04%  25.32% 
 November 1, 2015 53.90%  6.61% 14.79%  22.98% 
 June 24, 2018 53.13%  6.91% 15.72%  19.18% 
Karlsruhe June 7, 2015 53.69%  8.33% 16.09%  18.86% 
 November 1, 2015 60.02%  6.56% 14.33%  17.38% 
 June 24, 2018 55.06%  8.02% 16.03%  15.93% 
Cologne June 7, 2015 54.44%  9.05% 15.11%  18.83% 
 November 1, 2015 60.80%  6.84% 14.05%  16.84% 
 June 24, 2018 56.84%  8.58% 14.10%  15.44% 
Mainz June 7, 2015 55.01%  7.63% 13.26%  21.92% 
 November 1, 2015 59.55%  6.02% 11.92%  20.79% 
 June 24, 2018 55.58%  8.13% 14.11%  17.26% 
Munich June 7, 2015 57.78%  10.39% 21.07%  9.22% 
 November 1, 2015 63.35%  7.54% 19.14%  8.00% 
 June 24, 2018 56.05%  8.91% 20.03%  8.46% 
Münster June 7, 2015 65.72%  7.57% 11.35%  12.48% 
 November 1, 2015 71.05%  5.80% 10.27%  11.25% 
 June 24, 2018 59.14%  6.89% 14.74%  14.49% 
Nuremberg June 7, 2015 46.39%  13.29% 23.56%  13.14% 
 November 1, 2015 54.76%  10.21% 21.26%  11.44% 
 June 24, 2018 49.19%  9.56% 22.42%  11.16% 
Stuttgart June 7, 2015 55.05%  11.91% 12.50%  17.07% 
 November 1, 2015 60.89%  9.34% 11.92%  15.21% 
 June 24, 2018 57.61%  10.08% 13.04%  13.26% 
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The second effect of external voting has to do with 
the 10 percent electoral threshold. In order to win 
parliamentary seats, parties need to gain at least 10 
percent of the total number of valid votes, which is a 
sum of the external and internal votes. External votes 
were significant in getting the HDP into parliament in 
the November 2015 election, the threshold of which 
was 4.78 million votes. The HDP gained 4.91 million 
votes from within Turkey, barely helping it to pass 
the threshold. In this respect, the 234,000 votes that 
it won abroad were considerably effective. 
Beyond their material implications, external votes 
are also symbolically important. Easing the ability 
to vote from abroad by providing the necessary legis-
lation was an important part of the Turkish state’s 
concerted efforts, at the heart of which lies the for-
mation of a diaspora population that preserves its 
religious and linguistic heritage. Mobilizing constitu-
encies to vote was, in this respect, perceived by the 
ruling AKP as an important catalyst toward this end. 
In an interview in 2015, the then-president of the 
YTB noted the following: 
Twenty-seven percent of the migrant population is 
between the ages of 18 and 30. Socialization of this 
group mostly happened abroad. Similarly, the pro-
portion of the Turkey-born population is accelerat-
ingly decreasing vis-à-vis the proportion of the for-
eign-born population. Taking these two factors into 
account, we can say that the voter turnout rate is 
proportional to the migrant population’s ability to 
preserve their social identity and to continue their 
belonging in the homeland.56 
Strikingly, the youth are seen by AKP officials as 
the primary means for bringing about an imagined 
diaspora population. The overwhelming presence of 
youth-related projects in the YTB’s activities is argu-
ably not random and will likely continue in the com-
ing years. A statement by Zafer Sarıkaya, who acted 
as the former president of the UID until his election 
in the 2018 parliamentary elections as one of the 
Istanbul MPs of the AKP, validates this:57 
 
56 “What Do First of November Elections Mean for the 
Diaspora?” (in Turkish), Perspektif 246 (December 2015):  
11–13. 
57 “Sırakaya Has Already Started Working towards a Strong 
Diaspora” (in Turkish), Malumat 24, 11 July 2018, https:// 
zafersirakaya.com/sirakaya-guclu-diaspora-icin-kollari-sivadi/ 
(accessed 1 December 2018). Malumat is an online news por-
tal; their main audience is the migrant population. 
We will continue our hard work to strengthen 
the youths’ [sense of] belonging in the motherland. 
Young generations are indeed our future. We will 
hand our motherland to them. For this reason, the 
youth abroad carry special importance. We will 
make graduate fellowships more common in order 
to contribute to their education and specialization. 
To this end, we will also double the quotas that are 
specifically allocated in the Turkish universities for 
the youth abroad. In addition, we will increase in-
ternship opportunities in our country [Turkey]. 
We will introduce new modules into the Turkish 
public employment system in order to increase 
employment opportunities in public institutions. 
We pay special attention so that our people ab-
road, and especially the youth, do not drift away 
from our culture. We will continue our efforts 
toward the fulfillment of this aspiration. One of 
our projects, in this regard, is to organize trips 
bringing 100,000 young people to our country in 
order to introduce them to our culture and history. 
One of the bases of our culture is language. For this 
reason, we will support the opening of bilingual 
schools. In addition, we will also diversify and in-
crease projects but also project funding so that our 
children can learn their mother tongue. We will 
also encourage the launching of culturally sensi-
tive and compatible nursing homes. 
Diversity in Voting Preferences beyond 
the Numbers 
Unsurprisingly, the AKP uniquely dedicated a signifi-
cant part of its election campaign in 2018 to its “dias-
pora policies.”58 In a speech he delivered in Sarajevo 
in May 2018 at the sixth annual meeting of the UID, 
President Erdoğan noted the following: 
In order to deal with the problems of our citizens 
living abroad, we have founded the YTB. We have 
also enabled our citizens’ access to the state insti-
tutions, regardless of their location, by increasing 
the number of consulates and embassies. We al-
ways support our citizens’ involvement in civil so-
ciety activities. We are now in the process of estab-
 
58 See the PDF document of AKP candidate Mustafa 
Yeneroglu for member of parliament, http://www. 
mustafayeneroglu.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/AKParti_ 
YSKM_SecimBeyannamesi.pdf (accessed 1 December 2018). 
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lishing the Citizens Abroad Coordination Council 
in order to facilitate the activities of different insti-
tutions and improve the coordination among them. 
We are also planning to start in the consular 
regions abroad Advisory Boards, which will be di-
rected by the YTB and involve our citizens abroad. 
We will also work toward the foundation within 
the Parliament of a “Citizens Abroad Commis-
sion.”59 
As part of the AKP’s election campaign, in early 
June 2018, Turkish consulates were reported to have 
sent letters signed by President Erdoğan to registered 
citizens living in Germany. These letters asked for 
support for the AKP and Erdoğan in return for the 
services provided to the citizens abroad.60 Important 
to note here is that, even though no other political 
party systematically addressed in its election cam-
paign the “diaspora,” as did the AKP, opposition par-
ties also campaigned abroad to mobilize their base 
to vote. Nevertheless, lacking a competitive advan-
tage – given the institutional, organizational, and 
financial capacity that the AKP has built in the last 
decade through the deployment of state resources 
and civil society actors/networks within and outside 
of Turkey – opposition parties entered the race at 
a significantly disadvantaged position. 
Close to 90 percent of the Turkish media landscape 
is politically or financially dependent on the AKP gov-
ernment.61 Since the sale of the Doğan media group 
to the pro-government conglomerate Demirören 
Holding in 2018, nine of the ten most-watched TV 
channels and nine of the ten most-read national 
newspapers are owned by pro-government compa-
nies.62 It is not only the near-to-full control over the 
 
59 See https://www.ytb.gov.tr/haberler/cumhurbaskani-
Erdoğandan-yurt-disinda-yasayan-vatandaslara-mujde 
(accessed 3 December 2018). 
60 Turkish Consulates in Germany Send Erdoğan Propaganda 
Letter to Expatriates (Stockholm Center for Freedom, 10 June 2018), 
https://stockholmcf.org/turkish-consulates-in-germany-send-
Erdoğan-propaganda-letter-to-expatriates/ (accessed 1 August 
2018). 
61 “The Total Collapse of Freedom, Pluralism and Diversity 
in Turkey’s Mainstream Media”, Media Policy Project Blog, 24 
September 2018, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/ 
2018/09/24/the-total-collapse-of-freedom-pluralism-and-
diversity-in-turkeys-mainstream-media/ (accessed 13 February 
2019). 
62 “Dogan Media Group Sale Completes Control of Turkish 
Media”, Reporters without Borders, 22 March 2018. See https:// 
media but also the strong centralization of public 
finances that has given the AKP an unfair advantage 
vis-à-vis the opposition parties. One prominent exam-
ple of this is the AKP’s strategic deployment of the 
central government budget to funnel excludable 
goods to pro-party districts in Turkey as well as tar-
geting higher expenditure amounts, particularly in 
the area of education.63 
Outside of Turkey, the AKP’s competitive advan-
tage has, to a significant extent, been the result of 
its claimed ownership over the policies targeting 
migrants from Turkey and their foreign-born chil-
dren. Such a claim owes its power to the increasingly 
blurred boundaries between the political party and 
the state institutions. An additional factor that has 
contributed to the realization of this claim has been 
the conflation of the associational and political 
realms. Increasingly close contact between the party, 
state institutions, and civil society actors has created 
a patronage network that includes old and new asso-
ciations with close ties to the AKP government, such 
as DITIB and the UID. 
It should not be overlooked that 
voting patterns in Germany 
remained diverse. 
Yet, it should also not be overlooked that voting 
patterns in Germany remained diverse. Even more 
significant is that this was despite the AKP’s competi-
tive advantage over opposition parties in its access to, 
and mobilization of, the constituents. The variation 
in voting behaviors is best manifest in the vote shares 
of the AKP and the three main opposition parties, as 
the previous section on voting behavior demonstrat-
ed. Political party choices to a large extent reflect the 
historical variation in migration patterns, that is, 
the left-leaning and pro-Kurdish HDP seems to garner 
most of its support from those who came to Germany 
in the 1980s and the 1990s on political grounds. 
Among its constituencies are also students and those 
who recently came to Germany in the aftermath of 
 
rsf.org/en/news/dogan-media-group-sale-completes-
government-control-turkish-media (accessed 13 February 
2019).  
63 Melani Cammett and Davide Luca, Unfair Play: Central 
Government Spending under Turkey’s AK Party (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings, 20 June 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ 
future-development/ 2018/06/20/unfair-play-central-
government-spending-under-turkeys-ak-party/ (accessed 
13 February 2019). 
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the 2016 putsch, again on political grounds. The AKP, 
on the other hand, has a stronger base among those 
who came in the 1960s as guest workers. However, 
among the first arrivals, it is also possible to find HDP 
and CHP supporters, just as it is also possible to come 
across AKP constituencies among those who came 
after the 1980s. 
What Explains the Support and/or 
Sympathy for the AKP? 
The popularity of the AKP and President Erdoğan 
in  ermany among migrants from Turkey and their 
children is often explained by “loyalty to Turkey” 
and a “lack of democratic culture.” In addition to 
the methodological problems and conceptual issues 
related to the ambiguities surrounding terms such 
as “loyalty” and “democratic culture,” these expla-
nations say very little about the causal mechanisms 
behind the support and/or sympathy for the AKP and 
President Erdoğan. Failing to explain the perceptions 
and motivations of the Turkish voters in Germany, 
these accounts risk interpreting political attitudes 
on the basis of essentialist and essentializing biases. 
The empirical information provided in this section 
is based on life history interviews that the author con-
ducted over the course of a year in 2017/2018 with 
migrants from Turkey and their Germany-born chil-
dren. In total, 18 interviews (selected through snow-
ball sampling) were conducted with first- and second-
generation migrants. The shortest interview was 
45 minutes, whereby the longest one lasted for two 
hours. In addition, the author also conducted two 
focus groups that exclusively included women. The 
random sample of interviewees used in this study 
represents a diverse group by ethnicity, religion, re-
ligiosity, time of arrival, and legal status. The author 
also regularly attended events organized by various 
migrant associations and conducted participatory 
observations during the 2018 parliamentary and 
presidential elections. 
Even though it is not representative, the qualita-
tive data collected suggests that there is both a ma-
terial and an emotional basis to the support that the 
AKP and President Erdoğan garnered from voters in 
Germany. Socio-economic changes and perceived 
improvements in the quality of services at various 
state institutions, both within Turkey and Germany, 
created a positive image of the party in the eyes of 
its constituencies. Moreover, a strong sense of pride 
sustained by the rhetoric of a “strong Turkey,” which 
is perceived to be represented in the charismatic per-
sona of President Erdoğan and experienced through 
the expansive diaspora policies, seems to drive the 
emotional basis of the electoral support for the AKP 
and Erdoğan. 
Contra to the conventional wisdom, 
religiosity is not the primary moti-
vation to vote in favor of the AKP. 
Contra to the conventional wisdom, religiosity is 
not the primary motivation to vote in favor of the 
AKP. Many pro-AKP constituents, especially the older 
ones, seem to perceive the party as a continuation of 
the previous center-right political parties such as the 
Democrat Party, the Justice Party, the True Path Party, 
and the Motherland Party, rather than an Islamist 
party. Even though piety is an important feature of 
the everyday lives of many AKP constituents, it does 
not motivate political preferences as much as it 
shapes socialization patterns. One striking example 
of this, for instance, is the increasing discomfort in 
the last couple of years within the Milli Görüş circles 
of the AKP government.64 Yet, especially in times of 
crisis, such as the tension between the Netherlands 
and Turkey right before the 2017 referendum, a 
strong fear of losing social and political gains seems 
to have pushed even the Islamist constituencies with 
critical attitudes of the AKP and Erdoğan to strategi-
cally vote for the AKP. 
Material Benefits and Perceived 
Improvements in Well-being 
Perceived socio-economic improvements and better 
service provision, both inside and outside of Turkey, 
seem to play an important role in the electoral sup-
port given to the AKP and President Erdoğan. Until 
recently, Turkey’s economic development under AKP 
rule has been a source of awe for many observers, 
inside and outside of Turkey. The AKP rose to power 
in 2002 after one of the worst economic crises had hit 
the country, in 2001. After that, up until 2016, gross 
domestic product per capita increased from $9,090 to 
 
64 “The AKP Parliamentarian’s Reaction to Milli Gazete” 
(in Turkish), Hürriyet, 2 January 2017, http://www. 
hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/ak-parti-milletvekilinden-milli-
gazeteye-tepki-40324573 (accessed 13 February 2019). 
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$25,655.65 Turkey’s rapid economic growth over the 
course of the last 15 years has been facilitated, among 
other things, by a boom in the construction sector. 
During this period, the sector has transformed the 
skyline of Istanbul and many other cities, also con-
tributing significantly to the development of trans-
portation infrastructure.66 
Especially for the older generations, Turkey’s eco-
nomic growth since the early 2000s seems to have 
garnered support for – or at least sympathy toward 
– the ruling AKP. It is important to keep in mind 
that most of the first-generation economic migrants 
and their children who either came to Germany at a 
very early age or were born in Germany spend quite 
a considerable time of the year in Turkey and remain 
active beneficiaries of the Turkish welfare system. It is 
not uncommon for them to often compare the socio-
economic situation in the 1960s and 1970s with the 
socio-economic changes since the 2000s. 
These comparisons take multiple forms. Inter-city 
highways seem to be conceived as the hallmark of 
Turkey’s economic development under AKP rule. 
“Better” and “faster” access to healthcare services is 
another important reference point in the juxtaposi-
tions made between today’s Turkey and the Turkey 
that they came from, from what they remember.67 
Another noticeable point of attention is the perceived 
improvements in the quality of services provided 
at various state institutions. The interviewees often 
emphasized the increased efficiency at government 
offices since the early 2000s, together with positive 
changes in the attitudes of public employees – from 
“maltreatment” to “more humane” and “kind” inter-
actions: 
 
65 See the OECD data on Turkey’s economic indicators at 
https://data.oecd.org/gdp/gross-domestic-product-gdp.htm 
(accessed 22 November 2018). 
66 See https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/overview/turkeys-
construction-sector-maintain-its-significant-role-economy-
several-large-projects-under-way (accessed 22 November 
2018). 
67 Unlike many other low- and middle-income countries, 
Turkey under AKP rule has managed to transform the 
healthcare system toward universal and equitable coverage 
of all citizens. See Susan Powers Sparkes et al., “Political 
Strategies for Health Reform in Turkey: Extending Veto Point 
Theory”, Health Systems and Reform 1, no. 4 (2015): 263–75. 
Also see Volkan Yilmaz, The Politics of Healthcare Reform in 
Turkey (London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). 
Fifteen to twenty years ago, obtaining an identifi-
cation card or having any transaction done at a 
government office was very difficult. Back in 1997, 
I had to inquire about my father’s pension in 
Turkey. I went to seven different government of-
fices and received seven different answers. Then, 
I called my father to ask him to take care of it him-
self. Gathering the necessary information took him 
only 10 minutes. I figured out later that the public 
employees did not take me seriously and were pok-
ing at me because I was young. When you go to a 
government office today, civil servants are polite 
and try to help you as much as they can. We some-
times make a blunder because of not knowing the 
Turkish culture well. Nevertheless, the officer does 
not treat you badly, unlike the case in the past. 
Socio-economic developments and perceived improve-
ments in service provision seemed to have played an 
essential role in garnering support from constituen-
cies that historically voted for political parties of the 
center-right as well. In fact, the AKP’s success in con-
solidating power was, to a large extent, connected to 
its political ability to embrace large and diverse soci-
etal sectors as well as to distinguish itself, especially 
in the early 2000s, from the Islamist tradition that it 
came out of. This seems to have gained the trust of 
constituents who were rather suspicious of political 
Islam: 
My mother was, at the beginning, skeptical of 
Erdoğan. She was scared that he would be like 
Necmettin Erbakan [the founder of the Milli Görüş 
movement in Turkey, and several Islamist parties 
that came out of it]. Yet, afterwards, she realized 
that this was not the case. The AKP was also differ-
ent at the beginning. They did a lot of reforms, 
infrastructural investments, etc. We used to go to 
Turkey quite a lot. The roads have changed. The 
city that my mum comes from changed. My par-
ents attributed all these changes to the AKP. They 
used to say that they were treated “at the munici-
palities very well” as opposed to “the case before.” 
Outside of Turkey, consulates seem to be one of the 
key places where constituents experienced these per-
ceived manifold changes in public service provision. 
In addition to the YTB and its cooperation with civil 
society actors, consulates have also become central 
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actors in the third phase of Turkish policy-making.68 
The digitalization of citizenship services over the last 
decade has provided the Turkish migrant population 
and their children with easy and fast access to ser-
vices such as population registry, passport renewal/ 
extension, visa applications, etc. Getting access to the 
internet portal that provides online access to these 
services is possible after obtaining an identification 
number and a password from within a consulate. 
These changes in service provision, together with the 
growing level of cooperation with civil society actors, 
in essence reflect Turkey’s changing foreign policy 
outlook since the AKP came into power.69 Accord-
ingly, during the period between 2002 and 2015, the 
number of consulates increased from 55 to 81, and 
that of the embassies increased from 91 to 134.70 
The main premise of the new foreign policy outlook 
is that public diplomacy involves “state-citizen” rela-
tions, on the one hand, and “citizen-citizen” relations, 
on the other.71 
Interestingly, according to the Turkish Parliament’s 
Human Rights Sub-Commission activity reports, the 
improvement of consular services has been a popular 
demand since the 1990s. Before the AKP came into 
 
68 “What Do Political Parties Promise to the Voters 
Abroad?” (in Turkish), Perspektif 241 (May 2015): 16–21. 
69 Aydın, The New Turkish Diaspora Policy (see note 9), 12–13. 
70 “65 Consulates in 13 Years: The Total Number of Em-
bassies and Consulates Increased to 228” (in Turkish), in T. C. 
Basbakanlik Kamu Diplomasisi Koordinatorlugu; see Aksel, 
“Turkey’s Migrants and the Change in Policies” (see note 23). 
71 Public diplomacy activities used to be coordinated 
by the Public Diplomacy Coordination Office, which was 
founded in 2010 under the prime ministerial office. Fol-
lowing the transition into the new presidential system, they 
are now conducted by the Directorate of Communications 
of the Turkish Presidency. Its mission is stated as follows: 
“to develop a holistic communication strategy at national 
and international level comprising all state institutions 
based on a concept of common language; and to carry out its 
functions on this basis. To share Turkey’s policies, practices 
and approaches with public opinions and counterparts in 
a planned, continuous and effective manner, and to raise 
awareness. To monitor closely and evaluate media and think 
tanks, and to inform relevant authorities and public opin-
ions in this context. To manage/improve relations with the 
press; to take steps to facilitate the professional activities of 
press members and to contribute to the development of the 
press. To arrange and conduct necessary activities and regu-
lations for the effective management of the communication 
between the nation and state.” See https://www.iletisim.gov. 
tr/english/vizyon-misyon (accessed 15 May 2019). 
power, in 2002, there were complaints, for instance, 
about the small sizes of the consulates and especially 
the maltreatment of citizens wearing headscarves by 
the personnel.72 The perceived improvements in the 
quality and efficiency of consular services since the 
early 2000s seem to have contributed to the constitu-
ents’ positive perceptions of the AKP. 
The Rhetoric of a Strong Turkey 
Besides their material implications, constituencies’ 
positive perceptions about the socio-economic 
changes under AKP rule and better service provision 
at various government institutions inside and outside 
of Turkey have also had emotional effects. A strong 
sense of pride – sustained by the rhetoric of a 
“strong Turkey,” represented in the charismatic per-
sona of President Erdoğan and experienced through 
the expansive diaspora policies – seems to have 
driven the emotional basis of the electoral support 
for the AKP and Erdoğan. 
Constituents seem to have perceived 
the institutionalization and 
systematization of diaspora policies 
as the material manifestation of an 
attentive and caring governance. 
The institutionalization and systematization of 
diaspora policies under AKP rule seem to have been 
perceived by the constituencies as the material mani-
festation of what attentive and caring governance 
should look like. Consular services, for instance, 
stand as proof – in the eyes of the constituencies – 
to the increasing ability of the state to deliver on the 
demands of its citizens. Interestingly, this perception 
also resonates with the statements of political actors 
as well. For instance, during the first meeting of the 
“The Consultation Board of Citizens Abroad,73 in June 
 
72 Website of the Human Rights Sub-Commission of the 
Turkish Parliament, 21st Executive Term, the 3rd and 4th 
Legislation Years (in Turkish), 149–151, https://www.tbmm. 
gov.tr/komisyon/insanhaklari/docs/21dnm/21yd_34yy_raporu.
pdf (accessed 1 December 2018). 
73 The Consultation Board of Citizens Abroad functions 
in connection with the YTB. It was founded with the aim to 
design and implement policies that effectively and efficiently 
address the needs of the Turkish population abroad. Its 
members consist of the Turkish population across the globe. 
The Board holds annual meetings with civil society actors 
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2013, President Erdoğan noted that “a strong state is 
the one that attends to the needs of its own citizens, 
ethnic brothers, and friends.”74 Arguably, statements 
like this have further contributed to the strengthen-
ing of perceptions about Turkey becoming a strong 
state under the leadership of Erdoğan. 
President Erdoğan is indeed seen as the epitome 
of a strong Turkey, able to represent and defend its 
citizens abroad. He is regarded by the constituencies 
as a “fatherly” figure who is “well-respected” in the 
international arena, who “protects the interests of 
the migrants,” and who “delivers what he promises.” 
For instance, there is a common understanding that, 
ever since the AKP came into power, Turkish political 
actors have been received in Germany at the prime 
ministerial and presidential levels as opposed to the 
low-level diplomatic encounters that had taken place 
in the past. Moreover, many constituencies, including 
those who are not overt supporters of the AKP, also 
seem to applaud Erdoğan for “daring to challenge” 
European politicians: 
I am neither a big fan of AKP nor Erdoğan, except 
for the fact that he dares to challenge them [refer-
ring to European and German political actors]. No 
other politician before him did such a thing. My 
mother used to tell me that her friends used to 
poke fun at her when Turkish politicians came to 
Germany, saying that they came to ask for money 
again. This is no longer the case. Turkey is pro-
gressing. Look at Greece, Italy and Spain. […] The 
economic crisis hit Turkey as well but not as much 
as it harmed European economies. They are jealous 
of this fact. In addition, Erdoğan has no self-censor-
ship when he interacts with European politicians. 
Of course, he speaks nonsense every now and then; 
but still, he dares to challenge. 
It is not uncommon that this perceived change in the 
diplomatic encounters of Turkey – both in terms of 
status and rhetoric – is interpreted as a manifesta-
tion of Turkey’s changing position in global politics. 
Unsurprisingly, this view is also disseminated through 
pro-government media outlets. For instance, President 
Erdoğan’s last visit to Germany, in September 2018, 
was defined in one of the pro-government news-
 
and representatives from various government institutions 
in Turkey.  
74 “The Advisory Board of Citizens Abroad Met in Turkey” 
(in Turkish), Perspektif 223 (July–August 2013): 8–9. 
papers as a meeting that would bring the relations 
between Turkey and Germany into a “higher league.”75 
The prevailing understanding that Turkey became 
stronger – and as a result, joined the “league of ad-
vanced nations” – seems to inspire a strong sense of 
pride among AKP constituents while also motivating 
negative and often suspicious interpretations of atti-
tudes within Europe toward Turkey. The AKP con-
stituencies often attribute the deterioration of EU-
Turkey relations to the resentment that Turkey’s 
changing position in global politics has triggered in 
European countries in general, and among the Ger-
man public in particular: 
It seems like Europe sees the developments in 
Turkey as a threat to itself. Seeing this, one starts 
questioning why everything becomes a problem 
and a matter of criticism when Turkey is progress-
ing. Of course, the constant criticism within Ger-
many of what is happening in Turkey incites dis-
appointment for the Turks here. 
What drives such a strong sense of pride in Turkey 
under AKP rule and the leadership of Erdoğan is an 
important question. There is a widespread acceptance 
that diaspora communities often carry strong nation-
alist sentiments.76 The Turkish diaspora is by no means 
an exception in this regard. Yet, the AKP constitu-
encies’ tenacious appreciation of the party and the 
charismatic persona of Erdoğan can be explained not 
only by national pride. What seems to be at stake at 
this current moment has more to do with the chal-
lenge that the rhetoric of a “strong Turkey” poses to 
what is considered by the AKP constituency as the 
dominant understanding in Europe of Turkish 
people: 
Europe cannot bring itself to accept a strong Tur-
key. They assume that Turkey is still that of the 
1970s. Even if the country lacks European stand-
ards in politics, it is economically developed. Of 
course, Germans are not aware of these develop-
 
75 “The Visit of President Erdoğan Will Carry the Relations 
with Germany to a ‘Higher League’” (in Turkish), Yeni Akit, 
27 September 2018, https://www.yeniakit.com.tr/haber/ 
baskan-Erdoğanin-ziyareti-almanya-ile-iliskileri-bir-ust-lige-
cikaracak-522222.html (accessed 13 February 2019). 
76 Benedict Anderson, Long-Distance Nationalism: World 
Capitalism and the Rise of Identity Politics (Amsterdam: Center 
for Asian Studies Amsterdam, 1992). 
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ments. They still look at Turks as “barbaric,” 
“parochial,” “backward,” and “poor.” 
Apparently, the challenge posed by a “strong Tur-
key” – represented by Erdoğan’s charismatic per-
sonality and his “daring” style – helps repair an 
existing frustration among migrants and their Ger-
many-born children about their social standing with-
in Germany. Many complain about lacking equal 
recognition, even if they carry German passports: 
I obtained German citizenship when I was 18 years 
old. Since then, I always insisted on saying that I 
was a German citizen, only to realize that I was, in 
fact, not accepted as one. They do not accept you as 
a real German, even if you have German citizen-
ship. Realizing the impossibility of being accepted, 
I have decided to say, at the age of 35, that I am 
Turkish. During that time, we changed houses, in-
stalled satellite TV receptors, and started to watch 
Turkish television. When I started to say that I was 
Turkish, I was told that I was German. I responded 
back saying that I had never been accepted as Ger-
man. Integration should be two-sided. Germans 
perceive integration as assimilation. 
In the eyes of especially the second-generation mi-
grants, there appears to be a considerable gap be-
tween legal inclusion in Germany – via holding 
German citizenship – and social inclusion. Feelings 
of exclusion and misrecognition, expressed by the 
AKP constituency, do not come out of nowhere. They 
have a significant material basis. Among individuals 
of Turkish origin, unemployment rates are reportedly 
higher and education levels lower.77 According to the 
findings of a recent report on discrimination experi-
ences in Germany, individuals of Turkish origin – as 
well as those from the Middle East and North Africa 
region – are disadvantaged at a higher rate in the 
field of education as well as in the labor and housing 
markets.78 The exact causes of this perceived and 
 
77 Cem Özdemir et al., The Situation in Germany of Individuals 
with Turkish Origin: Assessments Commissioned by the Council of 
Experts on Immigration and Integration (in German), (Federal 
Office for Migration and Refugees, 2004), https://www. 
bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Downloads/Infothek/ 
Zuwanderungsrat/exp-oezdemir-zuwanderungsrat.pdf? 
__blob=publicationFile (accessed 13 February 2019). 
78 Steffan Beigang et al., “Discrimination Experiences in 
Germany”: The Results of a Representative Survey and Those of a 
Second Survey with the Affected Population (in German) (Federal 
experienced discrimination are difficult to pinpoint, 
as migration backgrounds often intersect with other 
factors such as socio-economic status79 and physical 
appearance – as in the case of wearing a headscarf 
or other manifestations of one’s religious affiliation.80 
Despite this difficulty, however, the AKP constituen-
cies often attribute their experiences of discrimina-
tion to their religious backgrounds: 
I was once having a conversation at the Mensa 
[university cafeteria] with friends about children’s 
names. I told them that the name was not that 
important for me as long as it is not a name for-
bidden by my religion. Even then, my friends told 
me that I had to adapt my attitudes. When will I 
be considered a full member of the society? Does 
it happen if I obtain German citizenship? Or if I 
change my name? Or if I get married to a German? 
Or if I convert to Christianity and start eating pork? 
When do such reactions come to an end? When 
will we be accepted fully? When I raised these 
questions, my friends responded saying that that 
this was not what they meant by “adapting.” But 
conversations always end up like this. Or, for 
instance, they tell you to go back. But I was born 
here. Where shall I go? “To where your parents 
came from,” they respond back. If you categorize 
me as such, I think to myself, why should I call 
myself German? You already place me within 
certain categories. Why do you, then, get upset 
when I say something that confirms these labels 
that you have already put on me? If everyone is a 
German, there will be no plurality in the society. 
They insist on turning an apple tree into a pearl 
tree. I refuse to accept this. 
Fear of Losing Social and Political Gains 
The fear of losing the social and political gains that 
were achieved under AKP rule is another emotional 
mechanism that seems to have shaped the decision 
to vote in favor of the AKP. It has already been men-
tioned that the boundaries between the ruling party 
 
Antidiscrimination Agency, 11 December 2017), 288, http:// 
www.antidiskriminierungsstelle.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/ 
DE/publikationen/Expertisen/Expertise_Diskriminierungs 
erfahrungen_in_Deutschland.pdf (accessed 13 February 
2019). 
79 Beigang et al., “Discrimination Experiences in Germany” 
(see note 78), 115. 
80 Ibid., 102. 
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and state institutions nearly disappeared during the 
two decades of governance under a single-party rule 
that has increasingly become authoritarian. In the 
eyes of some constituents, this seems to create a fear 
of losing their access to the improved service pro-
vision and benefits if the AKP loses power.81 
Especially those in Europe who cast a “YES” vote in 
the referendum are usually like us who came from 
rural Anatolia and whose relatives had no place 
in the [old political and economic] system. For in-
stance, the idea of having a university degree was 
unthinkable because there was no opportunity to 
do so. It is different now. There are growing oppor-
tunities in the last 10–15 years. There are many 
who continue their education, who work. Welfare 
of the society has increased. This is why they cast a 
“YES” vote. 
The fear of losing privileges is, however, not just 
limited to anxiety over losing access to social services 
and policies. Especially among the politically pious 
constituents, the fear of a potential takeover by the 
CHP if the AKP loses power seems to have motivated 
support for the AKP. This is especially the case among 
constituencies close to Milli Görüş, despite the in-
creasing discomfort and vocal criticism about AKP 
policies. At the core of this fear lies the strong asso-
ciation of the CHP with strictly secularist policies to 
restrain religion from the realms of law, education, 
and family, and to disempower non-state religious 
actors and teachings. Following the transition to elec-
toral democracy in 1946, the increasing amount of 
contact with religious networks and orders has, per-
haps unintentionally, led to an increase in the degree 
of infiltration by these networks and orders into asso-
ciational life since the 1960s. Starting in the 1970s, 
religious networks and movements also entered the 
realm of party politics as the struggle over controlling 
political organizations and the mobilization of Islam 
became fiercer. 
Conservative Islamist parties associated with the 
Nakşibendis – particularly the İskenderpaşa Cemaati, 
led by Sheikh Mehmet Zahit Kotku – were founded 
in the 1970s, concurrent with the rise of Islamist 
 
81 Also see Murat Somer, “Understanding Turkey’s Demo-
cratic Breakdown: Old vs. New and Indigenous vs. Global 
Authoritarianism”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 16, 
no. 4 (2016): 481–503. 
politics across the world.82 The AKP is the direct suc-
cessor and byproduct of these parties, which were 
repeatedly closed down throughout the 1970s, 1980s, 
and 1990s by the army or the Constitutional Court.83 
Political connections to religious movements and 
networks were, however, not limited to the Islamist 
parties. Turgut Özal, the leader of the Justice Party 
and the prime minister of the government established 
after the military coup in 1980, is also known, for 
instance, to have connections with the Nakşibendi 
order.84 
Against this backdrop, the political crisis between 
Turkey and the Netherlands in the months leading to 
the 2017 referendum and the tension with Germany 
were perceived as potential threats to the leadership 
position of the AKP, and thus to the political gains 
that Islamists had achieved during and under AKP 
rule.85 As such, they were also important watershed 
events in shifting the electoral decisions in favor of 
the suggested constitutional changes. As the CHP has 
not yet managed to detach itself from the image of 
an acute secularist party, the belief that the “CHP will 
take over if the AKP loses” motivated the shift in elec-
toral decisions. Nevertheless, it is also noteworthy to 
mention that there was a strategic rapprochement 
within the Milli Görüş movement – especially among 
the base of the Felicity Party – with the CHP in the 
eve of the 2018 elections. Given the high likelihood 
that the AKP will continue its authoritarian stand, 
thereby drawing criticism from within the Islamist 
movement, a similar rapprochement might continue. 
 
 
82 Eric J. Zürcher, Turkey. A Modern History (London: I. B. 
Tauris, 2017 [1993]), 260. 
83 Ateş Altınordu, “The Rise and Transformation of Ger-
man Political Catholicism (1848–1914) and Turkish Political 
Islam (1970–2011)”, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozial-
psychologie 65, no. 1 (2013): 383–408. 
84 Zürcher, Turkey. A Modern History (see note 82), 288. 
85 One needs to be cautious, however, not to make over-
generalizations about the political gains of Islamists during 
the 16 years of AKP rule. Since the 2018 elections, many 
Islamist brotherhoods (cemaat) and religious orders (tariqats) 
have found themselves under close scrutiny by the govern-
ment and President Erdoğan. See “Who Is Next in Line?’” 
(in Turkish), Rusen Cakir, 26 July 2018, http://rusencakir.com/ 
Sirada-hangi-cemaatler-var/6792 (accessed 13 February 2019). 
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The level of mass support given in Germany by the 
electorate to the AKP and President Erdoğan should 
be rethought outside of the frameworks of “loyalty” 
and “democratic culture.” Social policy, political 
discourse, media representations, economic benefits, 
and geopolitics combined, but also separately, affect 
voter preferences. As such, voting is neither a purely 
rational nor irrational behavior. It involves material 
and emotional calculations, especially at times when 
politics is increasingly being driven by emotions.86 
Economic growth and improved service provision 
within and outside of Turkey – together with the 
charismatic personality of Erdoğan and his daring 
political rhetoric – seem to have motivated voting 
preferences in favor of the party. Nonetheless, if it 
were not for the mediating effects of the multilayered 
and multi-foci struggles for political representation 
and equal recognition, social policy and political 
discourse alone would not have propelled the con-
stituents toward the AKP. What was rather at stake 
is that the AKP government’s concerted policies 
targeting migrants from Turkey and their foreign-
born children and the discourse of a strong state 
resonated with existing demands for more represen-
tation within Turkish society and a better organized 
associational realm in Germany that would improve 
the migrants’ social standing in Germany. 
The degree to which these material and emotional 
motivations prevail among different groups – and 
how these motivations interact with other factors – 
remains unanswered in this study. Even though the 
sample of interviewees that this paper builds its 
findings on is diverse, a larger and better represen-
tative sample is necessary to depict – at a higher 
confidence level – the relative importance of these 
material and emotional mechanisms with regard to 
the support given by different groups. Future research 
 
86 Jan-Werner Müller, “False Flags: The Myth of the Nation-
alist Resurgence”, Foreign Affairs 98, no. 2 (March/April 2019). 
might benefit significantly from such a survey by 
depicting a representative picture of the relationship 
between voting preferences and justifications, on the 
one hand, and that between preferences and factors, 
such as the time of arrival, historical patterns of vot-
ing, legal status, generational differences, as well as 
degrees and forms of religiosity, on the other hand. 
It is yet important not to conflate the 
motivations of the constituents with 
those of the political actors. 
Despite these shortcomings, however, the findings 
underline the importance of not conflating the moti-
vations of the constituents with those of the political 
actors. For the Turkish state, the diaspora population 
carries a strategic importance for foreign- and domes-
tic-policy ends. The emphasis of both AKP officials 
and pro-government civil society actors on the cul-
tural heritage of migrants from Turkey should be 
interpreted along these two axes. In the context of 
increasing social and political anxieties in Germany 
over Muslim immigration and integration, the Turk-
ish state has conveniently positioned itself as the 
defender, and even the patron, of its “Muslim” citi-
zens abroad and their offspring. In the domestic 
sphere, such positioning has arguably contributed to 
the image of a “strong and unified state and nation,” 
which has, in turn, aided President Erdoğan in fur-
ther consolidating his power. 
The focus on the preservation of cultural heritage, 
that is, Turkish language and Sunni identity, is not 
unique to the AKP government; it goes as far back 
as the policies designed in the aftermath of the 1980 
coup. What distinguishes the current moment, and 
especially the emphasis on religion, is the AKP gov-
ernment’s efforts in making “combating Islamopho-
bia” – more saliently in the last couple of years – 
the discursive backbone of its claim to become the 
patron of not only the migrants from Turkey and 
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their children but also the Muslim masses world-
wide.87 It is noteworthy that the first time that 
“Islamophobia” appeared in the Turkish Parliament’s 
Human Rights Sub-Commission reports88 was in the 
late 2000s. Concerned by the Migration Law enacted 
in Germany in 2005, the sub-commission’s activity 
report covering the period between October 2009 and 
October 2010 noted that “Islamophobic, xenophobic 
and racist tendencies influenced political decision-
makers. Germany, Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland, 
Belgium and France have through legal changes made 
family unification more difficult.” 
Following the deadly attacks in Norway in June 
2011 by the right-wing extremist Anders Breivik, who 
held strong anti-Muslim views, the sub-commission 
decided to monitor “Islamophobia in Europe and the 
US together with the xenophobic and racist attitudes, 
implementations and the related legal changes.”89 
These earlier attempts at reporting “Islamophobia, 
xenophobia and racism” culminated in January 2016 
with the launch of a new group within the sub-com-
mission to systematically investigate “Islamophobia 
in the West.”90 These efforts were accompanied by the 
annual European Islamophobia Report,91 launched by 
SETA in 2015, with contributions from internationally 
renowned Islamophobia scholars. The annual report 
is announced to the public each year during an inter-
 
87 Sinem Adar and Halil Ibrahim Yenigun, “A Muslim 
Counter-Hegemony? Turkey’s Soft Power Strategies and 
Islamophobia”, Jadaliyya, 6 May 2019, http://www.jadaliyya. 
com/Details/38646/A-Muslim-Counter-Hegemony-Turkey’s-
Soft-Power-Strategies-and-Islamophobia (accessed May 27, 
2019).  
88 These reports have been published since the early 1990s 
in order to address human rights issues concerning Turkish 
citizens in and outside of Turkey. Significant parts of the 
reports have since been dedicated to the problems and con-
cerns of Turkish migrants. The reports can be accessed at 
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/komisyon/insanhaklari/index.htm 
(accessed on 22 January 2019). 
89 The report covering the period between June 2011 
and October 2012, see https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/komisyon/ 
insanhaklari/belge/24_Donem_1_ve_2_Yasama_Yillari_ 
Faaliyet_Raporu.pdf (accessed on 22 January 2019).  
90 The report covering the period between November 2015 
and December 2017, see https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/komisyon/ 
insanhaklari/docs/2018/29_yy_faaliyetraporu1_07022018.pdf 
(accessed on 22 January 2019). 
91 The reports can be accessed at http://www.islamo 
phobiaeurope.com/events/seta-european-islamophobia-
report-2016/ (accessed 23 April 2019). 
national event in which AKP politicians regularly 
participate. 
Moreover, Muslims – Turkish and non-Turkish 
alike – can also get in touch with the call centers at 
the consulates to report verbal and physical attacks, 
harassment, as well as any discriminatory practices 
that they experience in everyday life. Zafer Sırakaya, 
one of the vice-heads of the AKP’s Foreign Relations 
unit, who himself was born in Germany to Turkish 
parents, noted the following in his new year’s greet-
ings at the end of 2018: 
European states fall short in addressing the unjust 
treatment that European Turks face in exercising 
their human and personal rights. The situation is 
even more dire given the worldwide exclusion of 
individuals who adhere to the Muslim faith. […] 
We have undertaken in 2018, as we did in previous 
years, significant steps to combat against an anti-
Islam mindset and populist anxieties feeding xeno-
phobia and discrimination. We will continue our 
endeavors in this regard. 
Even though Turkish diaspora policies primarily 
target migrants from Turkey and their foreign-born 
children – especially in Europe, in general, and in 
Germany, in particular – the discourse of “com-
bating Islamophobia” aims to gain broader appeal. 
Bülent Bilgi, the president of the UID, for instance, 
explained in an interview aired on Kanal Avrupa 
in December 2018 the change in the organization’s 
name in 2018 (previously called the Union of Euro-
pean Turkish Democrats): “There are not a lot of 
people with Turkish origin outside of Europe. In 
order to include these people who are not Turkish but 
regardless have a place in our emotional geography, 
we took out the word ‘Turkish.’ One such example is 
Bosnia. They are not Turkish but are sympathetic to 
Turkey.” As such, the AKP government’s strong em-
phasis on “combating Islamophobia” arguably aims at 
creating a Muslim diaspora while at the same endeav-
oring to position Turkey as the leader of the ummah.92 
 
92 See https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-
fundamental-rights/combatting-discrimination/racism-and-
xenophobia/combating-anti-muslim-hatred_en (accessed 
13 February 2019). 
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For the first time in the 2014 presidential elections, 
Turkish voters cast their votes at the ballot boxes 
stationed in their countries of residence. New regu-
lations introduced in 2008 into the election law – 
and the subsequent measures taken in 2012 – that 
enabled voting in the countries of residence were part 
of Turkey’s changing approach toward migrants from 
Turkey and their foreign-born children that began in 
2010. In the last decade, concurrent with a global in-
crease in diaspora policies, Turkish diaspora policies 
have entered a new phase. An overt interest in youth 
mobilization; the launching of new state agencies; 
cooperation between state and civil society actors in 
the realms of education, culture, and religion; and 
finally, a broader conceptualization of the diaspora 
defined by religious unity have so far marked this 
new phase. 
The systematization and institutionalization of 
diaspora policies under AKP rule – and increasing 
levels of cooperation with civil society actors – 
reflect a broader trend in the AKP government’s 
changing outlook toward foreign policy, defined 
through the concept of “public diplomacy.” Moreover, 
they run concurrently with changes in the domestic 
policy outlook, which has increasingly accentuated 
religion as an important source of legitimacy in poli-
tics. The AKP government’s rather ambitious political 
program of an independent and assertive foreign 
policy, on the one hand, and a socially conservative 
domestic policy, on the other, underlines an attempt 
to remake the national community within and out-
side of Turkey’s borders. This comes at a time when 
populist discourses, xenophobic nationalism, and 
anxieties around religious and cultural differences 
have gained currency in countries across the world, 
including Germany. 
The interest of the Turkish government in the 
migrant population is likely to continue in the future 
with a strong identitarian focus. This is not only be-
cause of the ruling AKP’s ongoing ambitions – both 
in foreign and domestic policy – despite the limits 
posed by acceleratingly deteriorating relations with 
its Western partners as well as those due to the con-
flict in Syria. Moreover, Turkey’s deepening economic 
crisis is further straining the AKP government, there-
by accentuating the need for economic remittances. 
There have already been policy changes introduced 
to this end in order to facilitate the flow of economic 
remittances to Turkey. For instance, new legislation 
in 2017 has exempted citizens abroad and those with 
a Blue Card from value-added tax on their first pur-
chases of residential and commercial real estate, as 
long as the transaction is made with foreign currency.93 
Moreover, since 2003, if Turkish citizens abroad want 
to invest in Turkey, they are legally considered “for-
eign investors,” and thus, subject to the Foreign 
Direct Investment Law.94 
Notwithstanding the likelihood that the AKP gov-
ernment and President Erdoğan will remain interested 
in accessing and mobilizing migrants and their for-
eign-born children, complete influence over them 
should not be taken for granted. The picture is more 
complicated. To start with, more than half of the 
eligible voters chose not to vote in the 2018 elections. 
Among those who voted, voting patterns remain 
diverse. Socio-economic mobility and status anxiety 
– either due to the feelings of misrecognition in Ger-
many or due to the fear of a secularist takeover in 
Turkey – seem to drive the voting preferences of the 
 
93 “Citizens Living Abroad No Longer Have to Pay Value-
added Tax While Buying Commercial and Residential Real 
Estate in Turkey” (Turkish), HaberTürk, 23 February 2017, 
https://www.haberturk.com/ekonomi/is-yasam/haber/ 
1401213-yurt-disinda-yasayan-turkler-turkiyede-aldiklari-ilk-
konut-ve-isyeri-icin-kdv-odemeyecek (accessed 10 November 
2018). 
94 See the Foreign Direct Investment Law at http://www. 
mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.4875.pdf (accessed 1 De-
cember 2018). 
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AKP constituency. Even though a large-scale repre-
sentative survey is necessary to reach generalizable 
conclusions, one could infer on the basis of this study 
that justifications for voting in favor of the AKP are 
likely to vary across generations. 
Policy-makers should also not overlook a seemingly 
growing discomfort within the population about the 
involvement of the Turkish government in their lives. 
The most recent example of such tension is the resig-
nation of the head and the entire board of DITIB in 
Lower Saxony, following allegations of interference 
by DITIB headquarters in Cologne and the Turkish 
religious attaché.95 Similar discomfort and criticism 
of “too much interference” was also voiced even by 
some of the constituencies, who otherwise are sym-
pathetic to AKP policies and the rhetoric of President 
Erdoğan. All this suggests that the political attitudes 
of migrants from Turkey and their Germany-born 
children should not be reduced to explanations such 
as “loyalty to Turkey” and “lack of democratic cul-
ture.” The dynamics are much more complex and 
require equally complex answers. 
The most essential starting point should be to dif-
ferentiate between the Turkish government’s system-
atic efforts to instrumentalize migrants and their for-
eign-born children toward its domestic- and foreign-
policy ends, and the migrants’ demands, which can 
be summarized in two points: the right to political 
representation and the right to equal recognition. 
Even though the rise of populist actors and anti-
immigrant sentiments in Germany and elsewhere 
makes addressing these demands challenging, there 
is ample room to design and implement appropriate 
policies. Against this backdrop, granting migrants 
from Turkey and their Germany-born children the 
right to vote in local elections is a necessary and vital 
starting point. An extension of the right to political 
representation would not only address a long-
standing demand within the population. It would 
also help cultivate a sense of belonging and accept-
ance in Germany. 
Furthermore, the question of political represen-
tation should not be confined solely to voting rights. 
 
95 “In Protest: The Head of DITIB in Lower Saxony Resigns” 
(in German), Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung, 28 November 
2018, http://www.haz.de/Nachrichten/Politik/Niedersachsen/ 
Ditib-Landesvorsitzender-Niedersachsen-wehrt-sich-gegen-
Einflussnahme-Ankaras-und-tritt-ab (accessed 5 December 
2018). Also see Rohe, Report on the Religious Instruction (see 
note 30), 36. 
Migrant associations are influential actors in making 
claims on behalf of migrants. Given the increasing 
influence of the Turkish state in the associational 
landscape, institutional autonomy should be highly 
encouraged. This is not an easy task, given that it 
requires a careful balancing act to not isolate the 
community from social and cultural networks. A 
good example of such a balancing act is a recent deci-
sion taken by the state of Hessen to suspend coopera-
tion with DITIB in the provision of religious educa-
tion until the latter provides sufficient evidence of 
institutional autonomy from Diyanet in Turkey and 
the DITIB headquarters in Cologne. As part of the 
decision, schools that have already offered, in co-
operation with DITIB Hessen, Islamic religious in-
struction will introduce a new religious education 
program in the coming school year as part of a school 
trial at grade 7.96 This new program is intended espe-
cially for pupils of Muslim faith and is set up under 
the sole responsibility of the state of Hessen. This 
model can set an example to other states as well as 
encourage institutional autonomy. 
Last, but not least, political actors should also be 
wary of exclusionary discourses against Islam and 
against practicing Muslims. In a highly secularized 
society such as Germany, social programs that would 
bring practicing Muslims in dialogue with non-prac-
ticing members of the society can help build societal 
trust. Toward this end, cooperation with non-partisan 
migrant associations should be encouraged. 
 
96 Hessen Ministry of Culture, “Hesse Suspends Expansion 
of Islamic Religious Education Taught in Cooperation with 
DITIB” (in German), Press Release, 20 February 2019, https:// 
kultusministerium.hessen.de/presse/pressemitteilung/hessen-
setzt-ausweitung-des-kooperation-mit-ditib-erteilten-
islamischen-religionsunterrichts-aus-0 (accessed 23 April 
2019). 
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Abbreviations 
AKP Justice and Development Party 
CHP Republican People’s Party / Cumhuriyet Halk 
Partisi 
DITIB Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs / 
Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für 
Religion e.V. 
HDP Peoples’ Democratic Party / Halkların Demokratik 
Partisi 
IGMG Islamic Community Milli Görüş / Islamische 
Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş 
MHP Nationalist Action Party / Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi 
MP Member of Parliament 
PKK Kurdistan Workers’ Party / Partiya Karkerên 
Kurdistanê 
SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and Social 
Research / Siyaset Ekonomi ve Toplum 
Araştırmaları Vakfı 
UID Union of International Democrats 
VIKZ Federation of Islamic Cultural Centers / Verband 
Islamischer Kulturzentren 
YTB Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related 
Communities / Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba 
Topluluklar Başkanlığı 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
